Independent research and formal public submissions on the structure of government, separation of powers, and the integrity of federal administrative process.
ืืืื โ Truth in Advocacy, Justice in Form
Government accountability requires an informed public and rigorous, well-documented analysis of governmental action. TKO exists to produce and submit such analysis โ grounded in original constitutional understanding, proper statutory construction, and formal legal research methodology.
Every submission is prepared to the standard of formal legal advocacy: properly cited to the United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Register, and binding judicial precedent. Submissions are filed through official agency dockets, congressional offices, and inspector general channels โ ensuring they become part of the permanent public record.
Whether officers of the United States are properly appointed under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. Analysis of Buckley v. Valeo, Lucia v. SEC, and related precedent governing principal vs. inferior officer distinctions.
The constitutional limits of congressional delegation to executive agencies. Application of the intelligible principle test under Gundy v. United States and the major questions doctrine under West Virginia v. EPA.
Internal Revenue Code compliance, Treasury rulemaking procedure under the Administrative Procedure Act, and structural questions regarding the appointment and removal of IRS leadership.
Structural analysis of the tripartite federal system. Congressional authority, executive power boundaries, and judicial review of agency action under Chevron and Skidmore frameworks.
Federal agency compliance with the APA, rulemaking comment processes, interagency coordination, and formal adjudication standards under 5 U.S.C. ยงยง 551โ559.
Inspector General referrals, Government Accountability Office submissions, congressional oversight correspondence, and Freedom of Information Act requests for agency records.
Dear Senator Hawley:
This submission addresses a structural constitutional concern regarding the appointment mechanism for the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service. Under the Appointments Clause, principal officers of the United States must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The question presented is whether the current appointment mechanism for the IRS Chief Counsel complies with this constitutional requirement.
U.S. Const. art. II, ยง 2, cl. 2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that officers exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States are subject to the Appointments Clause); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (clarifying the distinction between principal and inferior officers).The IRS Chief Counsel exercises significant authority pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ยง 7803, including the power to represent the government in Tax Court proceedings, issue legal opinions binding on the Department of the Treasury, and direct litigation strategy affecting billions in federal revenue annually. These functions โ prosecutorial authority, binding legal interpretation, and control over litigation โ are characteristic of a principal officer requiring Senate confirmation.
26 U.S.C. ยง 7803(b). The Chief Counsel "shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. ยง 7803(b)(1). The statutory text itself mandates Senate confirmation, yet the current appointment process may not comply with this requirement in practice.We respectfully request your office's examination of this matter and consideration of appropriate legislative or oversight measures to ensure full compliance with the Appointments Clause and the governing statute.
Respectfully submitted,
Timothy Karsch
TKO โ Constitutional Research & Public Advocacy
St. Louis, Missouri
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St. Louis, Missouri โ United States of America